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1 Introduction
Deforestation and forest degradation continue to be of concern in many Low and Middle-Income
Countries (LMICs). Over the past decades policy makers have adopted a broad range of pro-
grammes to try to reduce forest loss with varying levels of success. Conservation policies, such as
National Parks, that relied on "the heavy hand of the state" excluded local communities from con-
servation areas (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 631), often without compensation. When such "fence
and fine" actions failed to stem the continuing loss of forest, other approaches to forest management
were introduced, such as Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) and various forms
of participatory forest management. Though these initiatives have had some success, their frequent
failure was attributed in part to their failure to create appropriate incentives for conservation by
rural people (Hughes and Flintan, 2001, for a literature review; Ligon and Narain, 1999; Muller and
Albers, 2004; Albers and Robinson, 2011). More recently, Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES)
schemes have been introduced which explicitly link rewards to local communities in exchange for
verifiable impacts on reducing the rate of deforestation of a specific forest.
Yet even where a particular initiative might be demonstrated to be successful in terms of
reducing deforestation in a particular area, these initiatives were rarely implemented and evaluated
in the context of a broader landscape. For example, there was no explicit consideration of whether
the introduction of a protected area displaced extraction of forest resources into other less-protected
areas, thus reducing its effectiveness (Oliveira et al. 2007; Ewers and Rodrigues 2008; Robinson
et al., 2011). Indeed, many impact assessments continue to ignore such spatial displacement, that
is leakage, in determining the effectiveness of a particular protected areas on deforestation rates.
Bruner et al.’s (2001) article, though now somewhat dated, is a case in point.
The growing role of REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) in
global climate change negotiations, a mechanism that brings forest loss into climate discussions, has
increased interest in understanding, predicting, and measuring leakage. Leakage is recognized in the
Bali Action Plan - COP 13 as a "displacement of emissions" whereby a reduction in GHG emissions
in one area (or activity) leads to higher emissions in another area (or activity). Such leakage can
occur through a so-called "activity-shifting leakage", whereby individuals responsible for deforesting
and forest degradation shift some or all of their activity from the more protected REDD forest to
a less protected location (Aukland et al., 2003, van Oosterzee et al., 2012); or "market or partial
/ general equilibrium leakage" (Gan and McCarl, 2007; Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009; Rosendhal
and Strand 2011; Carbone, 2013) in which the leakage is transmitted through markets, reflected
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in changes in price for forest resources. Addressing leakage has been widely recognised as a major
challenge when designing climate mitigation policies that incorporate a REDD+ scheme (Wunder,
2008; Albers and Robinson, 2013). Focusing on contagion effects of deforestation, Robalino and
Pfaff (2012) argue that "that interactions should be considered in predicting deforestation over space
and time (...) when designing spatial incentive schemes.".
In this paper, we assess the impact of several avoided deforestation policies within a patchy
forested landscape.1 We accommodate two explicitly spatial aspects of forest landscapes. First,
forest patches are heterogeneous in terms of the returns to forestry that they offer. Second, adjacent
patches are linked through localised spatial displacement - leakage - such that one "neighbour’s"
deforestation actions may impact the returns to deforestation to those around them. Although we
keep this model generalizable and so do not specify a particular leakage mechanism, the interaction
can be likened to what is termed "activity-shifting leakage". One possible mechanism for such local-
ized leakage could be whereby reduced deforestation in one area results in less agricultural land than
there would otherwise be and thus decreased demand for agricultural laborers in that area, leading
to localized out-migration to adjacent areas which then experience a surfeit of agricultural laborers
relative to the status quo, making agriculture more attractive and thus increasing deforestation.
Alternatively, poorly functioning local timber markets resulting in relatively lower deforestation in
one location could increase the local price of timber, leading to increased deforestation pressures
in adjacent forest areas due to these localized increases in timber prices. Whatever mechanism
might be envisaged, central to the model is the idea that deforestation choices in one area influence
deforestation decisions in nearby patches.
We explore the implications of a number of policy aimed at reducing deforestation at a landscape
level: two Payment for Environmental Services (PES) policies, that can be likened to REDD+ poli-
cies - one focused on deforestation hotspots, the second being equally available to all agents (Bond
et al., 2009); the introduction of a conservation area (Amin et al., 2014); and, an agglomeration
bonus that reduces fragmentation by rewarding adjacent patches of lower deforestation in spatially
structured landscapes (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2008; Drechsler et al., 2010; Watzold and Drechsler,
2014). We determine the impact of each policy in terms of avoided deforestation and leakage levels.
We assess leakage here as the additional spatial interaction due to the policy implementation over
and above any spatial interactions that occur without the policy.
1Though we recognize the importance of forest degradation for climate and REDD+, in this paper we restrict our
analysis to deforestation.
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To our best knowledge, only a small number of papers in the literature have developed explicitly
spatial models of leakage. Murray et al. (2004) explore the impact of leakage from a reserve to
a forested area outside a reserve through a "price-induced supply response". The presence of a
reserve creates an excess demand for timber relative to the reduced supply, the price rises, and
the excess demand is met from outside the reserve. Gan and McCarl (2007) develop a theoretical
model of transnational leakage. Again, the mechanism is through prices, and the extent of leakage
is determined by the price elasticities of supply and demand for forest products. Angelsen and
Delacote (2013) propose an understanding of the pattern of shifting activities that may create
leakage between agricultural expansion and forest products harvesting: when land and labor are
complement in the net return function of the households, a policy aiming at reducing deforestation
may indirectly enhance forest degradation. Robinson et al. (2011 and 2013), focusing on forest
degradation rather than deforestation, demonstrate that the extent of leakage is driven in part by
both labour and product markets. When markets are functioning efficiently there is little if any
direct leakage, though there may be indirect leakage through nearby markets. In contrast, when
markets are poorly functioning, considerable displacement of forest degrading activities is likely.
Focusing on protected areas in Brazil, Amin et al. (2014) and Sauquet et al. (2014) present cases
of spatial strategic interactions between municipalities, which can be considered as leakage in a
situation of strategic substitutability.
In this paper, we explore the interplay between forest landscapes comprising heterogeneous
patches, localised spatial displacement, and avoided deforestation policies. We demonstrate how
the "best" policy, in terms of reduced leakage, depends on landscape heterogeneity. For example,
agglomeration bonuses are shown to be more effective where there is less landscape heterogeneity,
whilst conservation areas are most effective where there is more spatial heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop our explicitly spatial
model that demonstrates how spatial patterns of deforestation evolve over time, depending on
the heterogeneity of a forest landscape and the spatial interdependences between different forest
patches within this landscape. In Section 3, we describe four possible policies that aim to reduce
deforestation and consider their implications in terms of avoided deforestation and leakage. In
Section 4, we compare those policy options in terms of avoided deforestation, leakage and costs of
implementing each. We conclude in Section 5.
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2 The model
2.1 A spatial model of deforestation and leakage
The model is set up in the following way. We consider an n x n grid comprising a finite number
of adjacent forest patches. Our analysis can be considered at different scales. A forest patch might
be an area of forest belonging to one particular farmer in a rural community; a community forest
landscape in a particular region; or even forestland across a specific country. Whatever the scale,
deforestation decisions are made by representative agents at the level of the individual forest patch.
At the beginning of each period, each agent chooses how much of their forest patch to deforest, so
as to maximise their net present returns to deforesting.2 A particular agent’s payoff in a specific
period is a function of its own chosen deforestation level Dit; the exogenous characteristics of that
agent’s forest patch Xit; and, the agent’s neighbours’ previous-period deforestation decisions on
the adjacent forest patches in the landscape Djt−1 combined with the distance (or intensity of
interaction) αij from those neighbours.
We focus on forest patch heterogeneity within the forest landscape. However, Xit could also be
a function of the agent, or distance to markets. For example, relatively high values of Xit could
be due to highly profitable timber harvests in that particular patch due to a particular species
of tree being prevalent there; or to low outside opportunities for the particular agent, relative to
the other agents. The neighbour previous-period choices, Djt−1, combined with an interaction
parameter which measures the intensity of the interaction, αij , determine the size of the spatial
externality. This externality is a recursive relationship between agent i’s current deforestation and
its neighbour j’s previous-period deforestation. We refer to this externality as leakage, using the
language common in the literature on climate change and REDD+, which occurs if a decrease in one
agent’s level of deforestation results in an increase in the marginal payoff of their neighbours. Thus
agent i’s marginal profit negatively depends on the agent’s neighbours’ previous period deforestation
levels Djt−1 and the distance (or intensity of interaction) αij with those neighbours: ∂
2piit
∂DitDjt−1 < 0;
∂2piit
∂αijDit
< 0.
Any deforestation is permanent (such as conversion to agriculture), and so there is no forest
regeneration term. However, an agent could choose to actively reforest, in which case the forest
cover would increase, and would be indicated by a negative deforestation term. Further, only direct
neighbours’ choices over deforestation influence agent i’s payoff. Thus, αij ∈ [0; 1] if i and j are
2Note that agents are not forward looking in our setting.
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direct neighbours, αij = 0 if they are not. αij close to 0 indicates relatively small interactions
whilst, αij close to 1 indicates relatively large interactions.
We thus construct the model so that the optimal per-period level of deforestation for any
particular agent will only change over time due to the neighbour interaction term αij . That is,
with no interaction each agent deforests at a constant rate over time, allowing us to isolate the
impact of spatial interdependence as leakage in REDD+ parlance.
Every period t, each agent chooses its level of deforestation to maximize its payoff:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) (1)
The payoff obtained from deforestation is increasing and concave: ∂piit∂Dit > 0;
∂2piit
∂D2it
< 0.
The first-order conditions of problem (1) implicitly gives the optimal level of deforestation D∗i of
agent i, which depends on its own characteristics and its neighbours’ previous optimal deforestation
levels D∗jt−1:
D∗it = Dit(Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijD
∗
jt−1) (2)
Using this model we can therefore define spatial interactions at time t as the difference between
total deforestation at time t for α > 0 and deforestation for α = 0. The aggregate level of net
deforestation at time t across the landscape is given by:
Dt =
∑
i
Dit (3)
2.2 Specification and benchmark
To provide more concrete insights, we specify functional forms and calibrate the model. We
make a number of simplifying assumptions that allow us to ensure clarity of the model whilst not
losing any of the key elements that need to be captured. First, we assume for simplicity that
Xit = Xi at any time period t. Second, we let there be two types of forest patch. If Xi = X, agent
i gets high direct benefits from deforestation in a forest patch, whether due to highly profitable
deforestation and/or low outside opportunities; if Xi = X, agent i gets low direct benefits from
deforestation. Third, only direct neighbours’ choices over deforestation influence agent i’s payoff.
Thus, αij ∈ [0; 1] if i and j are direct neighbours, αij = 0 if not. Fourth, we allow for two levels of
interaction low (α) and high (α). Finally, we consider two contrasting patterns of ex ante spatial
heterogeneity that we term "clustered" and "dispersed". These patterns are set for a 5 x 5 grid of 25
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adjacent forest patches. Each cell corresponds to one forest patch which is controlled by one agent.
In a clustered case, adjacent forest patches tend to be of the same type. In contrast, in a dispersed
case, adjacent forest patches tend to be of different types. The dispersed case could be a proxy
for a highly heterogeneous landscape which has some forest patches where the potential returns to
agriculture are high, making deforestation more attractive, and others where the returns are low,
perhaps driven by varying elevation, access to water, or access to markets.
These two extreme spatial distributions allow us to emphasize the role of spatial homogeneity
and heterogeneity in determining the pattern and extent of leakage.
We consider a simple recursive quadratic payoff function of the form:
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) = (βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1)Dit − 12D
2
it (4)
Thus revenues from deforestation Dit in the absence of any spatial interaction effects are simply
equal to the forest patch type Xit multiplied by some parameter β,3 multiplied by the level of
deforestation Dit. The costs of deforestation are quadratic, increasing in Dit. This non-linearity
drives the result that agents typically do not deforest their full forest patch in the first period, but
rather we have an interior solution. The presence of the interaction term αij potentially changes
the returns to deforestation, depending on the size of αij and the actions of an agent’s neighbours.
This is what leads to the spatial externality - leakage. If an adjacent forest patch has a positive
level of deforestation in the period t − 1 then the returns to agent i are reduced relative to there
being no adjacent deforestation. Consequently, the neighbours’ previous-period choices will impact
negatively the agent’s payoff.
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition of Equation (4) gives the optimal level
of deforestation D∗i for agent i:
D∗it = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
∗
jt−1 (5)
We choose this specification such that, for any patch, any change in the rate of deforestation
from the period one level is due to spatial interactions with neighbouring patches, the only dynamic
parameter. Time t = 0 defines the initial conditions without spatial interactions. Thus deforestation
at time t = 0 is given by D∗i0 = βXi0, and this is the steady level of deforestation that each agent
would experience each period (until no forest in their patch remained) if αij = 0, that is, if there
were no spatial interactions.
3With β > 0.
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We run the model for 10 periods to design Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenarios (Figure 1).
We distinguish four potential cases that can be compared with the benchmark of no leakage,
depending on whether similar patches are clustered (C) or dispersed (D), and whether there
is high (H) or low (L) interaction: Clustered/Low-interaction (C/L), Clustered/High-interaction
(C/H), Dispersed/Low-interaction (D/L), Dispersed/High-interaction (D/H). The results are given
in terms of rates of deforestation for each patch each period.4 Parameters for the simulation analysis
are given in Appendix A.1.5
4Note that if our modeling was adapted to address forest degradation, these deforestation rates could be reinter-
preted as indicators of degradation intensity.
5Parameters were chosen here so that the agents in X-patches have positive rates of deforestation in the BAU,
while those in X-patches have negative rates (meaning they choose to reforest). This choice is made for presentation
purpose, as it is easier to distinguish each type on our landscape deforestation maps. It has no implication on the
nature of our results, which would be the same if both types of agents deforest in the BAU.
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Figure 1: BAU deforestation dynamics
Deforestation Intensity
BAU deforestation in the clustered case with low interactions
T=0 T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the clustered case with high-interactions
T=0 T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the dispersal case with low interactions
T=0 T=1 T=5 T=10
BAU deforestation in the dispersal case with high interactions
T=0 T=1 T=5 T=10
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Figure 1 can be understood in the following way. Ex ante, all forest patches of type X are
identical, and all of type X are identical. In the first period, because there is no prior deforestation,
all X agents make the same deforestation choice, as do all X agents. There are two types of edge
effects. One is imposed by the topology of the simulation model which has a finite number of
forest patches sucth that some patches are at the model landscape boundary and others are not.
As such there are edge effects imposed by the spatially finite model structure (we can imagine
some notional land outside the grid where αij = 0, where there is no scope for deforestation or
reforestation, perhaps an urban landscape, or perhaps a fully protected area of forest). However, of
particular interest in this paper are the edge effects that come from forest patches being adjacent
to other forest patches where there are agents making active deforestation decisions.
From Figure 1, we can observe a number of dynamic transitions to different deforestation
rates stabilization depending on the assumptions over spatial heterogeneity. In the C/L case, the
stabilisation is reached after 5 periods. Agents on X-patches all deforest at the same rate, whether
they are adjacent to an edge, another X-patch, or a X-patch. The choices of agents on X-patches
differ however depending on whether they are adjacent to at least one X-patch, in which case they
reforest; or only X-patch or an edge in which case they deforest. The reforestation occurs because
there is negative spatial interactions from adjacent X-patches. This reforestation creates a spatial
interaction into X-patches at the bottom of the grid which are adjacent either to other X-patches
or the a boundary. In the C/H case, the stabilisation is reached after 10 periods and is similar to the
C/L case, though the equilibrium reflects a more complex pattern of interactions. In the D/L case,
the stabilisation is reached after 5 periods with patches of reforestation alternating with patches
of deforestation. Finally, in the D/H case, the stabilisation is reached after 5 periods as well; the
pattern remains similar but with higher rates of deforestation and higher rates of reforestation.
Differences in aggregate net deforestation Dt are driven almost entirely by the forest patch
type, rather than the spatial distribution of forest patches. This result is driven by our model as-
sumption of homogenous and linear interactions between adjacent X- and X-patches. Though the
distribution of deforestation is different in the two spatial cases, clustered and dispersed, the aggre-
gate deforestation is much closer. Higher interactions tend to decrease deforestation for both types
of agent whilst lower interactions reduce the variability of deforestation in time. More generally,
higher spatial interactions increase deforestation variability.
10
3 Avoided deforestation policies and leakage
We assess policy options for reducing deforestation in our spatial setting. Policies are imple-
mented at t = 1 and the model run for 10 periods. With regards to each policy option, the aggregate
Avoided Deforestation (AD) at time t is measured in the following way:
ADt = DBAUt −DPolt (6)
DBAUt and DPolt are respectively the aggregate deforestation level in the BAU scenario and the
aggregate deforestation level with a policy option. Aggregated avoided deforestation is determined
for each of the four cases that we address: C/L, C/H, D/L, D/H.
We explicitly take account of the impact of the policy both on the specific forest patches where
the policy is implemented, but also on the total avoided deforestation so that we can analyse the
impact of the policy setting on leakage. We consider leakage in our analysis as the additional
spatial interaction due to the policy implementation over and above any spatial interactions that
occur without the policy.
Spatial interactions are recursive in our model, and they are the only source of dynamics.
Therefore there is no policy-induced leakage in the first year of policy implementation AD1. Our
measure of leakage (L) is composed of the difference between the avoided deforestation at time
t > 1 and the avoided deforestation at time t = 1:
Lt = ADt −AD1 (7)
We focus on four policy options.6 These policies are respectively:
• A Payment for Environmental Services (PES) that focuses on deforestation hotspots, a
"hotspot PES policy" (PESh);
• A PES applied to all agents, a "full PES policy" (PESf);7
• A Conservation Area policy (CA);
• An Agglomeration Bonus policy (AB).
6The policy calibration for each of the policy option is provided in Appendix A.2.
7We may underline that in our setting the PES is implemented also in patches where agents reforest effectively.
In this case, the PES takes the form of a reforestation incentive.
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3.1 Hotspot payment for environmental services policy
The hotspot PES policy (PESh) focuses on patches where there are higher deforestation rates
(X-patches). On these patches, the policy maker offers a price ph to each agent per unit of avoided
deforestation. Agent i’s payoff thus becomes:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + ph(DBAUit −Dit), ∀i ∈ [X] (8)
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1), ∀i ∈ [X] (9)
Where DBAUit is the deforestation level for agent i in the BAU scenario associated with one of
the potential four cases (C/L, C/H, D/L, D/H), and ph is the hotspot PES incentive.
In our specified framework, agent i’s deforestation is thus:
DPEShit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESh
jt−1 − ph, ∀i ∈ [X] (10)
DPEShit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESh
jt−1 , ∀i ∈ [X] (11)
Equation (10) makes clear that agents with X-patches will decrease their deforestation DPEShi
when there is a hotspot PES payment ph compared to BAU. This deforestation in turn changes the
level of leakage compared to the BAU case. Specifically, lower deforestation in the X-patches due
to a PES payment results in greater deforestation in adjacent patches, whatever the patch type,
relative to no PES payments. There is leakage if agent i is adjacent to any X-patches (clustered
case). Indeed, the decrease in the neighbours’ deforestation will have a tendency to increase agent i
deforestation. From Equation (11), we see that a type-X patch surrounded byX-patches (dispersed
case) tends to increase deforestation compared to the BAU.
The aggregate avoided deforestation following the PESh policy is then:
ADPESh =
∑
i∈X
ph −
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPEShjt−1 )] (12)
The first part of the right hand-side of Equation (12) represents the direct effect of the hotspot
PES on deforestation, while the second part is related to leakage.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Under a PES implementation on deforestation hotspots, leakage is stronger
when agents are surrounded by neighbours with higher deforestation rates. It follows that leakage
is stronger for X-agents in a clustered case, while it is stronger for X-agents in a dispersed case.
Finally, leakage is more important in a high-interaction case.
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Figure 2: Leakage is stronger for X-agents in a clustered case (left), and for X-agents
in a dispersed case (right) with low-interactions
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Proof: see Appendix B.1.
An illustration of Proposition 1 is given in Figure 2 with with low-interactions. We can see
that leakage from X-agents is more than 4 times the one of X-agents in the clustered case. In the
dispersed case, leakage from X-agents is about 1.5 times stronger than the one of X-agents.
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3.2 Full payment for environmental services policy
Under this full PES policy (PESf), we consider a PES that is offered to every agent (both X
and X), which brings:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + pf (DBAUit −Dit), ∀i ∈ [X,X] (13)
Where DBAUit is the deforestation level for agent i in the BAU scenario associated with one of
the potential four cases (C/L, C/H, D/L, D/H), and pf is the full PES incentive.
In our specified framework, agent i deforestation is thus:
DPESfit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
PESf
jt−1 − pf , ∀i ∈ [X,X] (14)
When the full PES pf is effective, it is straightforward to see that X-agents reduce their
deforestation DPESfit (or increase their reforestation). Therefore, agents surrounded by those agents
will increase their deforestation compared to the hotspot PES case.
The aggregate avoided deforestation following the PESf policy is then:
ADPESf =
∑
i
[pf − (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DPESfjt−1 ))] (15)
In this case, the direct effect of the PES is higher as all agents are offered the payment compared
to solely hotspot X-agents as seen in the first part of the right hand-side of Equation (15). The
second part is stronger for X-agents and weaker for X-agents.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Under a full PES policy, agents reduce their deforestation. However, agents
surrounded by X-agents increase their deforestation compared to the hotspot PES case. It follows
that leakage is stronger for X-agents (resp. weaker for X-agents) in the full PES case than in the
hotspot PES case. The net effect depends on spatial distribution: leakage is stronger (resp. weaker)
in the full PES case than in the hotspot PES case when agents are dispersed (clustered).
Proof: see Appendix B.2.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate Proposition 2, for a low interaction case.8
8Note however that the difference in terms of leakage is very small in our simulations. This is due to the fact
that we assume homogenous and linear interactions between X- and X-agents. The result would be different if we
assumed for instance stronger leakage between high-deforestation agents.
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Figure 3: Leakage is stronger for X-agents (resp. weaker for X-agents) in the full PES
case than in the hotspot PES case
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Figure 4: Leakage is stronger (weaker) under a hotspot PES than under a full PES in
a clustered (dispersed) case (resp. left and right)
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3.3 Conservation area policy
We now turn to the Conservation Area (CA) policy case whilst considering that the policy
maker rents the land from one particular agent i˜ (paying the opportunity cost of this land), and
freezes the land as a reserve so that no deforestation occurs. In this case, leakage from policy
implementation is limited in the sense that only one agent is source of leakage: only neighbours to
agent i˜ are subject to leakage.
Deforestation in this case takes the form:
DCA
i˜t
= 0, ∀i = i˜ (16)
DCAit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
CA
jt−1, ∀i 6= i˜ (17)
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Figure 5: Leakage is concentrated around the conservation area (C/LI case)
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The aggregate avoided deforestation following the CA policy is then:
ADCA = D∗˜
it
−
∑
i
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DCAjt−1)] (18)
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: With a CA policy, the reserve patch is the sole source of leakage. It fol-
lows that leakage is concentrated around the reserve. Leakage will therefore be more geographically
concentrated than under hotspot and full PES schemes.
Proof: see Appendix B.3.
As seen in Figures 5 and 6,9 leakage is concentrated around the CA. It may also happen that
positive feedback takes place as a second order effect.
9Note that we use mapping here in the same manner as in Figure 1 to represent the impact of CA in terms of
leakage. This is more straightforward to figure out leakage in the CA case, and leakage is expressed in deforestation
intensity.
16
Figure 6: Leakage is concentrated around the conservation area (D/LI case)
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3.4 Agglomeration bonus policy
The introduction of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) policy may be of interest in dealing with
adjacent patches whilst providing a joint incentive between agents. The AB policy takes the form
of a two-part PES payment: a payment for individual avoided deforestation, a; and, a payment
that is proportional to previous deforestation in the neighbourhood, b. For simplicity, we focus here
on the hotspot PES, and therefore a is equal to ph.10 This AB can thus counterbalance leakage
that was described in the hotspot PES policy case.
The AB policy is then set from:
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1) + a(DBAUit −Dit) + b(
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1)Dit, , ∀i ∈ [X] (19)
max
Dit
piit(Dit, Xit,
∑
j 6=i
αijDjt−1), ∀i ∈ [X] (20)
In our specified framework, agent i deforestation under the AB is thus:
DABit = βXit − (1− b)
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1 − a, ∀i ∈ [X] (21)
DABit = βXit −
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1, ∀i ∈ [X] (22)
The aggregate avoided deforestation following the AB policy is then:
ADAB =
∑
i∈X
[a− (
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)− bDABjt−1)] (23)
−
∑
i∈X
[
∑
j 6=i
αij(D∗jt−1 −DABjt−1)]
10For simulation purposes in Section 4, we set different values for ph and a.
17
Figure 7: Leakage and avoided deforestation decreases with the AB: b1 < b2 < b3 < b4
        	 




































        	 
 

































One can see here that increasing b indeed reduces leakage (by reducing the interactions between
neighbours). It is essential, however, to note that it also reduces the aggregate avoided deforestation.
Proposition 4: Leakage is decreasing in the AB policy. Leakage may even become negative for
sufficiently high b. However, the agglomeration bonus also decreases avoided deforestation.
Proof: see Appendix B.4.
Overall, indeed, the level of the agglomeration bonus b is negatively correlated to agent i
neighbours’ deforestation: the bonus thus performs as expected and reduces leakage. However, in
order to be effective, the agglomeration bonus also has to be positively related to agent i’s own
deforestation: it thus creates an incentive to increase deforestation. This negative effect can be
outweighed by increasing the direct payment a, which is done at the expense of a higher total cost.
It follows that reducing leakage through an agglomeration bonus is made at the expense of
reducing avoided deforestation. The tradeoff has to be considered carefully when implementing
such type of scheme.
4 Policy comparison
In this section, we focus on comparing the four policies presented in the previous section within
our four spatial patterns, that is C/L, C/H, D/L, D/H.
As stated before, all policies are calibrated in order to generate the same avoided deforestation
at period t = 1. The only dynamic parameter of the model is leakage. Therefore, the following
comparison cannot be considered as an assessment of policy options per se, but only of their
implications in terms of leakage.
18
Figure 8: Aggregate Avoided Deforestation
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4.1 Avoided deforestation and aggregate leakage
The respective aggregate Avoided Deforestation (AD) and Leakage (L) at the landscape scale
are displayed in Figure 8 and Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Aggregate Leakage
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Note first that the ranking of policy effectiveness depends on the spatial distribution that we
consider (Figure 8).11 When considering clustered cases, the AB policy is the most effective tool
in terms of aggregate AD. Hotspot and full PES policies bring intermediate results, while the CA
policy is the less effective policy instrument. In contrast, in the dispersed cases, the CA policy
becomes the most effective tool followed by the AB policy. Hotspot and full PES policies are the
less effective policy options. Finally, we may underline stronger interactions increase the variability
of avoided deforestation in time, especially for the CA policy case.
Looking at L corroborates our findings. L is the most important for the CA policy in a clustered
case, while the AB policy is the most efficient. In contrast, in dispersed cases, the CA policy becomes
the most effective tool in terms of L. Hotspot and full PES schemes are the one generating the
largest amount of L.
This variability of the effectiveness of the CA policy with respect to spatial distribution can be
explained by the spreading potential of the neighbours. In a clustered case, the neighbours to the
reserve are also deforestation hotspots, and therefore very sensitive to leakage. In a dispersed case,
11It is important to note here that the results from the AB policy are using the same bonus calibration.
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Figure 10: Costs
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the neighbours to the reserve are low-deforestation type agents. Those neighbours therefore play
as buffer zones when it comes to leakage.
We may also stress that the two kinds of PES schemes that we consider bring very similar
results in terms of AD and L. This is due to the linear form of our specified deforestation function
expressed in Equation (5).
4.2 Policy costs and average costs
The costs of the policies are set as follows:
• Hotspot PES policy (PESh): CPESh =∑i∈X p(D∗it −DPEShit ).
• Full PES policy (PESf): CPESf =∑i∈(X,X) p(D∗it −DPESfit )
• Conservation Area policy (CA): CCA = pii˜t
• Agglomeration Bonus policy (AB): CAB =∑i∈X(a(D∗it −DABit ) + b(∑j 6=iDABjt−1)Dit
Total costs and average costs are displayed in respectively Figure 10 and Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Average Costs
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It is interesting to note here that hotspot and full PES schemes are always the least cost options.
In a clustered case, the CA policy is the most costly option. This can be explained by the fact that
the CA policy requires to compensate the agent for its whole payoff in order to conserve its land,
while hotspot and full PES schemes are implemented on a voluntary basis, therefore distributing
the cost of the policy more efficiently.
In a dispersed case, the AB policy is the most costly policy option. Indeed, leakage essentially
concerns X-agents (as seen in Proposition 1), which are not concerned by the PES. It follows that
controlling leakage is more costly in this case, since the bonus is focused on X-agents. Moreover,
stronger interactions increase the variability of the results across time.
As a supplementary result, we propose in Appendix C. the comparison with the same first year
cost for each policy.
5 Conclusion
Governments in LMICs that engage in REDD+ projects typically undertake avoided deforesta-
tion and forest degradation policies that may directly or indirectly influence the drivers of forest
22
loss. A key concern that has been extensively voiced is that efforts to reduce forest loss in one
location may result in deforestation and forest degradation being displaced to another location,
that is leakage.
Leakage is a frequently mentioned as a shortcoming of REDD+ implementation, both at the
local and the international levels. In this paper, we consider several avoided deforestation policy
options, and assess their implications in terms of leakage, avoided deforestation and costs. We apply
our analysis to different spatial features. Though we model a spatial analysis of deforestation with
localized leakage, the analysis is relevant to any public good provision with spatial interactions in
which the action of an agent has a direct impact on their neighbours’ payoff. Note that our model
overlooks potentially important REDD+ topics. For instance, we assume here perfect monitoring
of deforestation. We also assume homogenous interactions from low-deforestation agents and high-
deforestation agents, which may not be true in real life. Nevertheless, several interesting findings
can be found from our model.
First, leakage is sensitive to the spatial distribution of forests patches through agents’ defor-
estation actions. When they are clustered in the same area, a CA policy through a reserve imple-
mentation will have the worst outcome in terms of leakage. In contrast, this policy will have the
most effective outcome if agents are dispersed over the area. Under a hotspot PES policy, leakage
strikes different agents depending on the spatial distribution. If agents of same type are clustered
in the same area, then leakage will strike high deforestation agents. In contrast, leakage will strike
more low deforestation agents in a dispersed case. Although setting a full PES policy on all agents
should reduce leakage, we show that this reduction of leakage is only marginal. Increasing the scale
of the PES indeed creates some new sources of leakage. The implementation of a AB policy can
be an interesting tool to reduce leakage, although this policy option happens to be more costly.
Second, hotspot and full PES policy schemes appear to be the least cost option for reducing
deforestation. Moreover, they appear to be the most effective tool in terms of avoided deforestation
under a fixed budget. It follows that if the policy maker sets its short-term objective in terms of
an aggregate level of avoided deforestation to achieve and a lower level of leakage, respectively AB
and CA policies respectively in a clustered case and a dispersed case can be the preferred options.
However, more classic PES schemes are relevant when the policy maker aims at minimizing costs,
regardless of leakage.
Finally, we showed that the intensity of the interactions unambiguously tend to increase the
variability of the aggregate avoided deforestation. This result gives the insight that avoided defor-
23
estation policies should be assessed in the long run, with sufficiently long periods of observation, in
order to avoid focusing on short-term episodes, particularly when interactions happen to be strong.
Appendix A. Simulation parameters
Appendix A.1. Parameter values
Parameter Value
β 1
X 5
X 0
α 0.05
α 0.1
Appendix A.2. Policy calibration: same avoided deforestation at t = 1
Parameter C/L C/H D/L D/H
ph 0.327 0.295 0.3654 0.3465
pf 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.18
a 0.409 0.443 0.433 0.433
b 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059
b1 0.003
b2 0.00586
b3 0.007
b4 0.009
Appendix B. Proofs
Appendix B.1. Proposition 1
Under a hotspot PES policy, only X-type agents are targeted. Thus, they are the only agents
experiencing a direct decrease of their BAU deforestation. It follows that leakage only comes from
those agents in the first place. Then, given our spatial setting, leakage impacts more X-type agents
in a clustered case, and X-type agents in a dispersed case.
24
Appendix B.2. Proposition 2
Under a full PES, X-agents reduce directly their deforestation. They are therefore source of
leakage for their neighbours. In contrast, X-type agents are source of weaker leakage for their
neighbours compared to the hotspot PES case as they receive a lower payment: the payment has
indeed to be lower, since the policy is calibrated to achieve the same level of avoided deforestation
after the first year. We directly obtain that leakage is stronger (resp. weaker) in the full PES case
than in the hotspot PES case when agents are dispersed (clustered).
Appendix B.3. Proposition 3
If the CA policy leads to a reserve in one part of the map only, it is straightforward that leakage
will be concentrated around that particular area.
Appendix B.4. Proposition 4
The payment proportional to previous deforestation in the neighbourhood, b, decreases the
impact of the spatial interaction from the neighbours. Leakage is thus decreasing in b. However,
deforestation under the PES with a bonus is increasing in the level of b:
∂DABit
∂b
=
∑
j 6=i
αijD
AB
jt−1 > 0 (24)
Appendix C. Policy calibration and comparison with the same first-
year costs
In order to get complementary results, we run the model calibrated so that the four policies
bring the same costs at the first year. We consider the C/L case through the parameters below
and Figure 12.
Parameter C/L
ph 1.086
pf 0.565
a 0.915
b 0.0059
25
Figure 12: Policies with the same first-year costs
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In this case, one can see that PES (hotspot and full) become the most effective tool in terms of
avoided deforestation, but also bring the largest amount of leakage. Yet, it remains the least cost
option.
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